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Blushing after a moral transgression in a prisoner’s
dilemma game: appeasing or revealing?
PETER J. DE JONG,* MADELON PETERS,
DAVID DE CREMER AND CHRISTIEN VRANKEN
Maastricht University, Maastricht, the Netherlands
Abstract
This study investigated the alleged remedial effects of blushing in the context of real-time interactions.
Therefore, 30 pairs of prosocial individuals participated in a prisoner’s dilemma ‘game’. The
experiment was framed as an objective test of moral behaviour. To elicit a shameful moral
transgression, one individual of each pair was instructed to select the non-habitual cheat-option on
a pre-defined target trial. Supporting the idea that violation of shared rules elicits blushing, the
defectors displayed a blush on the target trial. Yet, unexpectedly, there was a negative relationship
between the observed blush intensity and the trustworthiness attributed to the defectors. One
explanation might be that the ‘victims’ used the blush response to deduce and interpret the defector’s
motive. As the antecedent behaviour involved in the present context was not completely unambiguous
with respect to the perpetrators’ motive (e.g. innocent playing around vs. maximizing outcomes) the
observers might have interpreted blushing as signaling that the situation should be interpreted as an
intentional violation of a social standard. Together the available evidence suggests that only in the
context of unambiguous antecedent behaviours blushing has remedial effects, whereas in ambiguous
situations blushing has undesirable revealing effects. Copyright # 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Blushing is a unique human response which predominantly occurs in face-to-face contacts involving
shame or embarrassment (Shields, Mallory, & Simon, 1990). It is a very common emotional response
and virtually all people blush at least occasionally (Edelmann, 1990). Blushing is not an all-or-none
phenomenon, but experienced as varying in duration and intensity. Accordingly, physiological
assessments indicated that individuals’ facial coloration varies as a function of the intensity of
self-presentational predicaments (e.g. Mulkens, De Jong, Dobbelaar, & Bogels, 1999).
The blush response is usually limited to the face (sometimes spreading to the ears, neck and upper
chest; Simon & Shields, 1996; Leary, Britt, Cutlip, & Templeton, 1992), and because facial
expressions play such an important role in social interactions, it is tempting to assume that social
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blushing should be considered as a functional communicative signal rather than a trivial
epiphenomenon of (undesired) social attention (e.g. Darwin, 1989). Germane to this suggestion, it
has been argued that displays of shame and embarrassment may serve appeasement-related functions
(e.g. Keltner, Young, & Buswell, 1997). Publicly conveying embarrassment or shame would signify
the actor’s recognition that he or she has committed a social or moral infraction and sincerely regrets it.
In its turn, this message may mitigate the negative social impression and evoke reconciliation-related
behaviour in the observers (e.g. Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996). In contrast, failing to
appear embarrassed or ashamed after violating a social/moral rule may be interpreted as indicating that
the actor is not aware of or not concerned about his or her transgression.
In accordance with its alleged appeasement-related function, it has been found that (motoric)
displays of embarrassment, indeed, help to restore the actor’s public image after a mishap (Semin &
Manstead, 1982). That is, when asked to evaluate a shopper disturbing a display tier of toilet rolls in a
foodstore (which was shown on video), participants attributed more positive dispositional character-
istics to the actor when he appeared embarrassed than when he did not appear embarrassed. In other
words, displaying embarrassment seems effective in warding off negative attributions. Similarly,
individuals depicted on a slide from whom was told that they had committed a social transgression
elicited higher levels of sympathy in the observers when displaying shame than when displaying
amusement or a neutral facial expression (Keltner et al., 1997).
Although there is increasing evidence indicating that there are distinct displays of embarrassment
and shame (Keltner & Buswell, 1996), blushing may well occur in both embarrassing and shameful
situations (Shields et al., 1990). Following this, several authors have speculated that social blushing
shares appeasement-related properties with other expressions of embarrassment and shame (e.g. Cutlip
II & Leary, 1993).
Consistent with such a view, it has been shown that embarrassed individuals who believed that the
researcher did not perceive their blushes in the context of a self-presentational predicament,
subsequently engaged in alternative remedial behaviours, whereas participants who thought their
blushes were perceived as evidence of embarrassment, did not (Leary, Landel, & Patton, 1996). That
is, these individuals acted in a way as if they realised that their blushing serves as a remedial gesture.
In a similar vein, other authors accentuated the communicative and remedial effects of blushing in
the context of shame. An elaborate conceptualisation of the possible communicative and remedial
properties of blushing in the context of shame can be found in Castelfranchi and Poggi’s (1990) book
chapter ‘Blushing as a discourse: Was Darwin wrong?’ In short, these authors argued that people are
likely to blush if they violate social/moral rules which they (think to) share with the observers. In their
view, blushers communicate in such situations that they are sensitive to the judgement of the observers
and, at the same time, that they share the observers’ values. The former would have the function to
inhibiting aggression and avoiding the loss of one of the group’s loyal members, whereas the latter
may serve to strengthen the social rules and to underline the actor’s trustworthiness (cf. de Waal,
1995). The fact that blushing cannot be voluntarily produced seems of particular relevance in this
respect, as it prevents blushing from being instrumentally used (e.g. when it would be efficient to
pretend shame). In other words, because of its involuntary nature the blush response may act in a way
to stress the actor’s sincerity in displaying shame and regret for violating a rule.
Although several authors have speculated that social blushing serves an important communicative
and remedial function, thus far direct empirical evidence to support this assertion is extremely scarce.
In a first attempt to empirically document the alleged remedial properties of social blushing, we
recently presented participants with a series of vignettes which described embarrassing incidents that
took place in a shop (cf. Semin & Manstead, 1982). In line with the idea that blushing serves a
remedial gesture, the blushing actors were rated much more favourably on personality dimensions that
are related to trustworthiness than their nonblushing counterparts (de Jong, 1999; Experiments 1 & 2).
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Supporting the idea that blushing would be a relatively convincing display of embarrassment or shame
(i.e. because it cannot be simulated), the remedial effects of blushing were found to be even more
pronounced than those of motoric expressions of embarrassment. Moreover, blushing actors
were evaluated less negatively on the more global personality characteristics which are likely to
facilitate cooperation between individuals (e.g. likeability). Thus at least at the symbolic level,
blushing after a social infraction is represented as a (relatively convincing) remedial gesture.
The present study was designed to extend these earlier findings in three important ways. First, the
present study focuses on shameful rather than embarrassing situations to explore whether the remedial
effects of blushing are restricted to the context of seemingly involuntary mishaps (e.g. de Jong, 1999),
or may also be evident in the context of shameful, moral transgressions as proposed by Castelfranci and
Poggi (1990). Second, the present experiment was designed to investigate whether the appeasement
conceptualisation of the blush response will also hold in the context of in vivo circumstances rather than
imagined situations (cf. Parkinson & Manstead, 1993). Third, and perhaps most importantly, the present
experimental set-up allows us to investigate not only the influence of blushing on the characteristics that
are attributed to transgressors but also the observers’ actual behaviour in an interactional context.
More specifically, we tested the following hypotheses that directly follow from Castelfranchi and
Poggi’s (1990) communicative account of blushing. First, we investigated whether violation of a
shared rule, indeed, elicits a blush response in the transgressor (hypothesis 1). Second, following the
alleged remedial function of blushing we tested the hypothesis that blushing will lead to more
favourable impressions of the transgressor (i.e. more positive global evaluation and higher levels of
attributed trustworthiness) (hypothesis 2). Finally, we investigated whether blushing after a moral
transgression not only mitigates the negative social impression but would also positively affect the
observer’s actual (conciliatory) behaviour in real-time interactions (hypothesis 3). Although blushing
may evoke reconciliation-related behaviours via its favourable influence on the transgressors’ social
impression (cf. Tangney et al., 1996), they might also be (partly) independent consequences of the
blush. That is, emotional expressions may exert their influence on others’ behaviour irrespective of its
explicit symbolic or affective representation (e.g. De Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, in press).
Therefore, we formulated no a priori predictions in this respect.
To test the experimental hypotheses, we selected a homogeneous group of individuals sharing the
important social goal of cooperation (i.e. prosocial individuals). These individuals participated as pairs
in a 10-trial prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG). A PDG is characterised by the occurrence of two
conflicting motives (cooperation versus defection) individuals experience in interdependent situations.
In such a context, moral concerns with respect to cooperation are likely to be strong (e.g. Kerr, 1995).
Accordingly, it has been shown that prosocial individuals’ response strategy is typically guided by the
aim to (a) maximise joint outcomes, and (b) restore equality in outcomes (De Cremer & van Lange,
2001; van Lange, 1999). That is, previous research showed that prosocials generally approach
interdependent others in a cooperative manner and continue to do so until the interdependent other
fails to exhibit cooperative behaviour (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; van Lange, 1999). Then, prosocials
turn to noncooperation in a rather unforgiving manner (van Lange, 2000). In other words, after being
cheated, prosocial individuals will reciprocate by defecting themselves (i.e. exhibit ‘behavioural
assimilation’). One may even expect tendencies to ‘overassimilation’, motivated by their strong desire
to restore equality in outcomes (De Cremer & van Lange, 2001; van Lange, 1999). In addition,
prosocial individuals more strongly evaluate cooperative and noncooperative others (interdependents)
in terms of morality than proselfs and are, therefore, likely to consider noncooperative individuals as
exploitative and unfair (van Lange, 1999).
Thus our participants were all individuals who deeply care about cooperative and positive
interactions. To further fuel the conceptualisation of defecting as being a moral transgression, the
present PDG was explicitly framed as an objective test of moral behaviour. Relatedly, each participant
Blushing after a transgression 629
Copyright # 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 32, 627–644 (2002)
was individually explained that cooperative choices were morally superior above cheating, although
the latter option would result in larger financial profit for the cheater. To elicit a shameful
transgression, for each pair, one individual was instructed to select the non-habitual cheat-option on
a pre-defined target trial (and to cooperate on all other trials).
Within this particular context our hypotheses led to the following specific predictions: (1) defecting
on the predefined target trial will result in blushing; (2) the interdependent others will evaluate the
defectors less negatively as a function of the defectors’ blush intensity; (3) the prosocial victims’
habitual tendency to reciprocate cheating behaviour (behavioural assimilation) will be attenuated by
the defectors’ blush response.
METHOD
Participants
Participants were 58 undergraduate students of Maastricht University (faculties of Psychology, Health
Sciences, and Medicine). As the vast majority of the students at these faculties are women, it would be
rather difficult to find sufficient male volunteers to allow for reliably evaluating gender effects.
Therefore, we preferred a homogeneous sample of female participants. They were selected from a
larger sample (N¼ 248) on the basis of their scores on a written version of the nine-item Decomposed
Game measure (see below). Only individuals with a distinct prosocial value orientation were invited
for participation. Mean age was 19.3 years (range 17–26 years). In return for their participation,
participants of the experimental group received a fixed amount of 10 guilders (equivalent of approx.
4.5 Euro). The control group could earn an additional sum depending on their choices during the
prisoner’s dilemma game (maximally the equivalent of approx. 1.5 Euro, which was paid in natura).
Materials and Assessment
Social Value Orientation
To assess individuals’ social value orientation we used the nine-item Decomposed Games measure
(Messick & McClintock, 1968; van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). The Decomposed Games instrument
has been shown to be internally consistent (e.g. Liebrand & van Run, 1985), reliable over substantial
time periods (Eisenberger, Kuhlman, & Cotterell, 1992), and robust against social desirability effects
and different mood states (e.g. Platow, 1992).
The measure consists of nine items, each containing three alternative outcome distributions with
points for oneself and an (anonymous) other. Each outcome distribution represents a particular social
value orientation. An example is the choice between alternative A: 500 points for self and 500 points
for other; B: 560 points for self and 300 for other; and C: 500 points for self and 100 points for other.
Option A represents the cooperative or pro-social orientation, because it provides an equal distribution
of outcomes. Option B represents the individualistic option because the outcomes for self are
maximised (560 versus 500) irrelative of other’s outcomes. Finally, option C represents the
competitive orientation because this distribution maximises the difference between own outcome
and other’s outcomes (Choice C: 500 100¼ 400, versus A: 500 500¼ 0, and B: 560 300¼ 260).
Individuals are usually classified as prosocial, individualistic or competitive when at least six
choices (out of nine) are consistent with one of the three orientations (e.g. van Lange & Kuhlman,
1994). Because the strength of participants’ prosocial value orientation was a crucial issue in the
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present experiment, we used an even more stringent criterium: only those who selected eight or nine
prosocial alternatives were invited for participation in the experiment proper.
Prisoner’s Dilemma
The dilemma task was carried out in pairs. During the experiment, participants were facing each other
and were seated on a distance of approximately 1.8 metres from each other. There was no screen in
between, so participants could clearly see each other. The (female) experimenter was sitting half-way
in a perpendicular position towards the participants. There were 10 trials (which was unknown to the
participants). During each trial participants had to make a choice between cooperating and defecting.
Participants indicated their choice by raising a green or a red sign (which was constructed on the basis
of a beach tennis bat), saying ‘cooperation’ and ‘defecting’, respectively. The parametrics of the
present PDG were as follows. When both participants of a pair selected the option to cooperate, both
participants received the same sum of 5 quarters of a Dutch guilder (a); when both participants selected
the option to defect, both participants received only 2 quarters (b); in the case of a single defector, the
defecting participant received 8 quarters (c); whereas the cooperating counterpart received nothing (d).
As such, these outcome distributions are in line with the prerequisites of a PDG: c> a> b> d and
2a> cþ d> 2b (cf. Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975). The ‘rational’ strategy in such a PDG is to defect,
since he or she is better off defecting when the interdependent other decides to cooperate (8 rather
than 5) as well as when the other decides to defect (2 rather than 0). In other words, irrespective of the
interdependent other’s response, one’s personal outcomes are best served by defecting. The normative
choice, of course, is to cooperate.
The present experiment was framed as an objective test of moral behaviour, and each participant
was individually told that cooperative choices were morally superior above defecting, although the
latter option would result in larger financial profit for the defector. For each pair, one individual
(experimental group) was instructed to select the non-habitual defect-option on a predefined target
trial (i.e. trial 4) and to cooperate on all other trials.
During the dilemma game, trial number as well as participants’ scores were presented on-line on a
17-inch computer screen by means of two coloured bars (one representing the scores of the
experimental participant and one those of the control person). In addition, there was a digital display,
keeping record of the amount of money that was earned thus far (for each participant separately). The
screen was clearly visible for both participants (approximately 1 metre distance, angle 45).
Physiological Blush Response
Cheek coloration was used to index participants’ blushing and was recorded from a (modified) HP
model 15230A plethysmograph transducer. To measure changes of the level of individuals’ cheek
coloration (i.e. level of blood pooling) rather than changes in pulse amplitude, the transducer was
modified in such a way that it was d.c. coupled rather than ac coupled (cf. Shearn, Bergman, Hill,
Abell, & Hinds, 1990; Mulkens, de Jong, & Bogels, 1997, 1999). The offset was individually
calibrated and set at minus 3 V on a scale ranging from minus 10 V to plus 10 V.
Skin Conductance
Skin conductance level was recorded from two Beckman Ag–AgCl electrodes (8 mm diameter),
placed on the medial phalanxes of the middle and ring finger of participants’ non-dominant hand,
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using the method of constant voltage (0.5 V) (see Dawson, Schell, & Filion, 1990). The electrodes
were filled with an isotonic paste following the recommendations of Fowles, Christie, Edelberg,
Grings, Lykken, and Venables (1981) and connected to a Beckman Skin Conductance Coupler (type
9844). All physiological signals were sampled with a frequency of 1000 Hz by a Compaq 486
(33 mHz) computer.
Subjective Measures
After each trial (and before the first), participants made several judgements by means of 100 mm
Visual Analogue Scales (VASs). Although we were only interested in particular ratings (see below) all
participants were asked to rate their interdependents as well as themselves for all dimensions. This was
done to hide the aim of the present investigation and to conceal the fact that within each pair, each
individual had a different role. We included ‘intensity of the blush response’, ‘strength of shame’
(both ranging from 0 (not at all) to 100 (very much)), ‘trustworthiness’ on a scale ranging from 0 (very
reliable) to 100 (very unreliable), and three more global personality characteristics which are likely
to facilitate the cooperation between individuals: sociability (social¼ 0, antisocial¼ 100), likeability
(likeable¼ 0, unlikeable¼ 100), and sympathy (sympathetic¼ 0, unsympathetic¼ 100).
(Before being subjected to the analyses, VAS scores referring to reliability, sympathy, likeability,
and sociability were recoded in a such way (100 minus x) that high scores refer to a positive
meaning).
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to the experimental or control group, with the restriction that
within each pair, participants should be studying at different faculties. This was done to minimise the
chance of participants being known with each other. To further minimise contact between the pairs of
participants prior to the experiment, each individual was invited to a different room. They were also
separately instructed by different assistants. At some points, the instructions for the experimental
group were different from those for the control participants. Yet, upon arrival, both groups of
participants were informed that the experiment concerned the investigation of moral behaviour. First,
it was extensively explained, by using several examples, that cooperation is morally superior over
defecting, although the latter type of behaviour is often profitable for the defectors themselves. Then,
the assistants informed the participants that this experiment was designed to test individuals’ moral
behaviour. Following this, participants were familiarised with prisoner’s dilemma games and with the
functional (parametric) characteristics of the present task in particular.
The experimental group was then informed that they would earn a fixed sum of 10 guilders when
participating in this experiment, whereas the amount of money that the other participant (control
group) would receive afterwards would be completely dependent on the choices each of the
participants would make throughout the experiment. They were told that there were several conditions
in this research project allowing for investigating various patterns of cooperation. It was explained to
the experimental group that in their case, it was required to select the defect option during the fourth
trial and to cooperate on all other trials. In addition, the instructing assistant explained that neither the
research assistant who would be present throughout the experiment nor their interdependents were
informed about this instruction, ‘so they will think that it is your own choice to defect on trial 4’. This
procedure was followed to minimise the risk that participants would anticipate not being considered
responsible for choosing the ‘defect’ option during the fourth trial.
632 Peter J. de Jong et al.
Copyright # 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 32, 627–644 (2002)
The control group was told that their payoff during this experiment would depend entirely on the
choices each of the participants would make throughout the experiment.
Following this, both groups of participants were told that we were interested not only in the type of
choices they would make throughout the experiment but also in the concomitant physiological
responses. They were informed that it would therefore be necessary to apply some electrodes before
the start of the experiment. Furthermore, it was explained that, throughout the experiment, they would
be asked to evaluate some aspects related to themselves and to their ‘adversaries’ by means of VASs.
Meanwhile, it was stressed to both groups of participants that they were not allowed to talk to their
‘adversaries’.
Following this individual instruction, participants were guided to the experimental room. The
assistant who instructed the control participants guided the social-dilemma-task in the experimental
room. First, she, again, shortly explained the procedure of the present experiment using a black board
to illustrate the implications of all four possible response combinations. In addition, she showed the
screen and how/where the current trial was displayed and illustrated how the bars and display on the
screen depicted participants’ actual results throughout the experiment. Then the plethysmograph and
electrodes were attached. Although we were interested only in the physiological responses of the
experimental group (and which were actually measured), electrodes were attached to both participants
to conceal the fact that within each pair, each individual had a different role.
After the apparatus had been checked the experiment started and the assistant asked the participants
to complete the first series of VASs (one series referring to themselves and one series referring to their
interdependents). Following this, the assistant asked participants to prepare for raising the signs. After
5 seconds the assistant pressed a button connected to the computer which resulted in a beep. As
instructed, both participants immediately raised a sign after the sound of the beep (the button press was
also registered by the computer allowing the physiological data to be related to the relevant events).
The experimenter fed the respective responses to the computer, which resulted in an update of the
screen reflecting the participants’ scores. Meanwhile, participants were asked to complete another
series of VASs. When both participants had completed the VASs, the assistant, again, asked
participants to prepare for making a choice. This procedure was continued until the tenth trial was
finished. To allow physiological responses to wear off, there was a minimum inter-stimulus interval
(between making two choices) of 30 s. After the experiment was finished, participants were paid and
debriefed.
Data Reduction and Analysis
General
Because the dyad (rather than individual participant) was the unit of investigation, only those pairs of
individuals were included in the final analyses with whom the experimental participant indeed
cooperated on all trials apart from the fourth, and the control participant cooperated at least on the first
four trials (i.e. before the experimental manipulation). All experimental participants fulfilled this
requirement, yet four control participants selected the defect option before being defected themselves,
resulting in 25 suitable pairs of participants (see above).
Both physiological parameters were analysed off-line by means of a specifically designed computer
program (cf. Mulkens et al., 1997, 1999). For each trial, peak levels were detected within a 15 s time
window that started 5 s prior to the beep sound (indicating that participants had to raise the ‘defect’ or
‘cooperate’ sign) and that ended 10 s after this beep.
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In all statistical analyses we compared the responses during the target trial with those during the
immediately preceding (third) trial. We used the immediately preceding trial as the baseline
assessment to minimise the artefactual influence of systematic drifts (e.g. due to habituation processes)
and to optimalize its comparability with the target trial (e.g. with respect to novelty).
Validity of Manipulation
As a manipulation check we first tested whether we were successful in eliciting shame via the
experimentally induced transgression during the target trial. Therefore, we subjected the VAS ratings
(of the experimental group) referring to their feelings of shame to a paired t-test. As an additional
check we also tested whether the interdependent others (i.e. control participants) observed increased
levels of shame in their experimental counterparts during the target trial. Finally, we tested whether the
experimental participants’ level of general arousal (i.e. peak levels SCL) reliably increased during the
experimental trial (by means of paired t-tests), to be sure that participants were not completely
indifferent/detached with respect to their choice behaviour (e.g. because they attributed their defecting
to the experimental instruction).
To check whether the (experimentally induced) transgression resulted in less favourable impres-
sions (and thus leaving sufficient room for blushing to act as a buffer), we compared the global
personality characteristics that were attributed to the experimental group before and after
having defected by means of a 2 Trial (3 versus 4) 3 Characteristic (sympathy, likeability,
sociability) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). In a similar vein, we tested whether the
trustworthiness that was attributed to the transgressors declined from trial 3 to trial 4 (by means of a
paired t-test).
Hypotheses
To test whether the transgression resulted in a detectable blush (hypothesis 1), we compared both the
physiological blush intensity and the observed blush intensity (i.e. rated by the control participants)
between trial 3 and trial 4 (by means of paired t-tests). To explore whether the
experimental participants themselves were aware of their blush response, we also tested within the
experimental group (i.e. transgressors) whether the selfrated blush intensity increased from trial 3 to
trial 4.
To test whether blushing attenuates the negative influence of a transgression on the trustworthiness
and more global personality characteristics attributed to the transgressor (hypothesis 2), Pearson p–m
correlations were computed between the transgressors’ blush intensity (physiological and observed),
on the one hand, and global evaluation (mean of sympathy, likeability, sociability ratings) and the
attributed reliability, on the other.
To test whether blushing attenuates individuals’ tendency to reciprocate after being cheated
(hypothesis 3), we compared the blush intensity (observed and physiological) of the experimental
participants whose opponents continued with cooperation on the fifth trial (i.e. after being cheated)
with those whose opponents discontinued cooperation and raised the ‘defect’ sign on the fifth trial.
To explore the potential influence of other factors apart from blushing on the control
participants’ decision to continue or discontinue cooperation, we carried out similar analyses
with respect to observed shame, attributed trustworthiness, and the more global personality char-
acteristics.
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Sustaining the validity of the decomposed game measure that we used in the present selection
procedure, the vast majority of control participants selected the ‘cooperate’ option before being
cheated by the experimental group on trial 4. Only four out of 29 participants selected the ‘defect’
option without being cheated themselves (i.e. before the fifth trial). Due to the purpose of the present
experiment these four participants (and their experimental counterparts) were excluded from further
analyses.
Perceived and Observed Shame
The experimentally induced transgression was perceived as a considerably shameful event. That is,
mean self-reported shame scores (within the experimental group) were considerably higher during the
target trial than during the immediately preceding trial, means being 45.6 (SE¼ 5.6) and 12.4
(SE¼ 2.8), respectively (t(24)¼ 5.7, p< 0.001). Also their interdependents (control participants)
observed a stronger shame response during the fourth (target) trial than during the third trial, means
being 22.6 (SE¼ 4.1) and 9.5 (SE¼ 2.1), respectively (t(24)¼ 3.22, p< 0.01).
Skin Conductance Level
Participants (of the experimental group) displayed higher skin conductance levels (SCL) during the
target trial than during the preceding trial (t(24)¼ 3.82, p< 0.01), indicating that the general level of
arousal was relatively high during defecting (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. Defectors’ maximum skin conductance level during the target trial (4) and both the preceding and the
subsequent trials
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Attributed Personality Characteristics
As intended, defecting resulted in considerably less favourable judgements of the transgressors with
respect to both their more global evaluation and their attributed trustworthiness.
Sympathy, Likeability, Sociability
A 2 Trial 3 Characteristic MANOVA revealed a significant multivariate effect of trial
(Fhotelling¼ 23.1, p< 0.001), indicating that defecting resulted in a less favourable evaluation
with respect to these more global personality characteristics, overall means being 90.4 (SE¼ 2.1) and
68.5 (SE¼ 4.2), respectively.
Reliability
The trustworthiness that the control participants attributed to their experimental opponents strongly
declined after being cheated during the fourth trial. Mean attributed reliability decreased from 90.3
(SE¼ 1.8) to 58.0 (SE¼ 5.5), (t(24)¼ 5.6, p< 0.001).
Prediction 1: Defecting on the Predefined Target Trial Will Result in Blushing
Cheek Coloration
Peak levels of the defectors’ cheek coloration as a function of trial are shown in Figure 2. A paired
t-test indicated that the peak level was significantly higher during the target trial than during the
immediately preceding third trial (t(24)¼ 2.70, p< 0.01). Thus the present results are in line with the
idea that breaking a shared rule results in blushing.
Figure 2. Physiologically registired maximum facial coloration of the defectors during the target trial (4) and
both the preceding and the subsequent trials
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Subjective Blush Intensity
In line with the physiological assessment, the control participants observed higher blush intensities in
the experimental group during the target trial than during the immediately preceding third trial, means
being 23.7 (SE¼ 4.7) and 10.8 (SE¼ 2.6), respectively (t(24)¼ 2.20, p< 0.01). The self-perceived
blush response of the experimental group was very similar to those observed by their (control)
opponents, means being 18.1 (SE¼ 3.4) and 8.6 (SE¼ 1.5) on trial 4 and trial 3, respectively
(t(24)¼ 2.8, p< 0.01).
Prediction 2: Interdependent Others Will Evaluate Defectors Less Negatively
as a Function of the Defectors’ Blush Intensity
Blushing and Global Evaluation
To investigate the relationship between blushing and the more general characteristics attributed to the
defectors, Pearson p–m correlations were computed between the defectors’ blush intensity (physiolo-
gical and observed) and their global evaluation (mean of the of sympathy, likeability, sociability ratings)
during the target trial. Yet none of the correlations approached significance (see Table 1). Thus, a
relatively strong blush intensity was not found to result in relatively fewer negative global evaluations.
Blushing and Defectors’ Trustworthiness
To investigate the relationship between blushing and attributed reliability, Pearson p–m correlations
were computed. In contrast to the predictions, there was a significant negative rather than positive
correlation between observed blush intensity and the reliability attributed to the defectors (see Table 1).
No significant correlation emerged between the physiological blush intensity and attributed reliability,
although the physiological blush intensity correlated significantly with the intensity of observed shame.
To further investigate the relative contribution of observed blush intensity, physiological blush
intensity, and observed shame to the reliability attributed to the defectors while controlling for the
global evaluation and the attributed reliability on the preceding trial, a forward regression analysis was
carried out. Results indicated that observed blush intensity (beta¼  0.45, p¼ 0.02) was the single
best predictor of the attributed reliability. None of the other variables could explain a significantly
additional proportion of variance. The proportion of variance in reliability scores explained by this
variable was 21%. The negative beta value indicates that relatively strong blush responses resulted in a
Table 1. Pearson p–m correlations between the reliability attributed to the defecting participants, the intensity
of their blush response and their expression of shame as observed by their opponents, the global evaluation of the
defectors’ personality characteristics, and their physiological blush response
Reliability Obs. blush Phys. blush shame IE
Observed blushing 0.45* — — — —
Physiological blush 0.08 0.12 — — —
Observed shame 0.17 0.42* 0.41* — —
Initial evaluation 0.13 0.07 0.41* 0.12 —
Initial reliability 0.01 0.13 0.28 0.16 0.84*
Note: *p< 0.05.
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relatively less reliable impression. More detailed information concerning the (bivariate) interrelation-
ships between the variables that were included in the regression analysis is provided in Table 1.
Prediction 3: Prosocial Victims’ Habitual Tendency to Reciprocate Cheating Behaviour (Behavioural
Assimilation) Will Be Attenuated by the Defectors’ Blush Response
After being cheated on trial 4, the majority of the final group of (control) participants continued
cooperation. Only, 7 out of 25 participants selected the ‘defect’ option on trial 5. To explore whether
blushing modulates individuals’ tendency to cooperate after being cheated, we compared the blush
intensity of the experimental participants whose opponents continued with cooperation on the fifth
trial (i.e. after being cheated) with those whose opponents raised the ‘defect’ sign on the fifth trial.
Because of the uneven distribution of participants per cell (7 versus 18), the following ANOVA should
be interpreted with care. The 2 Trial (3 versus 4) 2 Group (Continued versus Discontinued
cooperation) ANOVA revealed no significant trial by group interaction (F(1, 23)< 1). In other words,
the experimental counterparts of the participants who continued with cooperation (Con-group) did not
show a relatively strong blush response while defecting. Such an interaction was also absent at the
level of observed (subjective) blush intensity (F(1, 23)< 1). Thus neither at the physiological level nor
at the level of observed intensity there were any differences between both groups of defectors.
To explore whether other factors apart from blushing might have played a role in the control
participants’ decision to continue (Con-group) or discontinue (Discon group) cooperation, we carried
out similar analyses with observed shame, attributed trustworthiness, and the more global personality
characteristics. With respect to the observed intensity of shame, there were no differences
(F(1, 23)< 1). Yet a significant trial by group interaction was evident with respect to the reliability
that was attributed to the experimental participants (F(1, 23)¼ 4.7, p< 0.05). Subsequent t-tests
indicated that during the third trial there were no differences between both groups, means being 91.1
and 91.4 for the Con and Discon groups, respectively (t(23)< 1). However, after being cheated, the
Con-group reported a mean reliability score of 65.2 (SD¼ 24.5) with respect to their experimental
counterpart, whereas the Discon-group reported a significantly lower mean score of 39.1 (SD¼ 27.6)
(t(23)¼ 2.3, p< 0.05). A 2 Trial (3 versus 4) 2 Group (Con versus Discon) MANOVA with respect
to the more general personality characteristics also revealed a significant trial by group interaction
(F(1, 23)¼ 7.9, p< 0.01). Subsequent one-way MANOVAs indicated that during trial 3 (i.e. before
being cheated) both groups displayed very similar evaluations of their opponents (F(1, 23)< 1). Yet
after being cheated, the Con-group reported a significantly more positive evaluation of the defecting
participants than the Discon-group (F(1, 23)¼ 13.3, p< 0.01), overall means being 76.3 (SD¼ 12.5)
and 48.5 (SD¼ 26.0), respectively.
DISCUSSION
The major results can be summarised as follows:
(1) Selecting the counter-habitual ‘defect’ option elicited a blush response in pro-social individuals as
indexed by physiological assessment, observational judgement, and selfreport ratings.
(2) Relatively strong blush responses while defecting were related to relatively low rather than to
relatively high levels of attributed trustworthiness.
(3) The blush response of the participants whose interdependents continued with cooperation after
being cheated was not relatively intense.
638 Peter J. de Jong et al.
Copyright # 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 32, 627–644 (2002)
Sustaining the validity of the present experimental setup, the experimentally induced transgression
was perceived as a considerably shameful event. That is, mean self-reported shame scores (within the
experimental group) were substantially higher during the target trial than during the immediately
preceding trial. The reliability of this finding is further sustained by the fact that also their
interdependents (control participants) observed a stronger shame response in the experimental group
during the target trial than during the preceding trial. In addition, the experimental group showed
elevated levels of general arousal while defecting, indicating that they were emotionally affected
(e.g. ashamed) by their choice behaviour. Together, these findings converge to the conclusion that the
present experimental approach was successful in eliciting a shameful transgression under controlled
conditions. Meanwhile, it should be acknowledged that the transgression in the present PDG differs
from those of people in everyday life, as we instructed participants to violate a norm, whereas in
everyday life people usually have a choice whether or not to violate a norm. Therefore, the present
transgressors’ emotional expressions will come closer to those of people who feel situationally forced
to violate certain rules which they share with the (unexpected) observer, then to those of people who
deliberately choose to violate certain norms. However, it is important to note that the exact mechanism
that leads to the transgressors’ emotional expressions is irrelevant for investigating its communicative
and remedial effects on the observers, which is the primary aim of the present study.
Blushing After a Moral Transgression
Corroborating previous findings based on a vignette methodology (de Jong, 1999, Experiment 3), the
present study showed that also during real-time interactions violating a shared rule elicits a blush
response (hypothesis 1). The various measures that were used in the current experiment were highly
consistent in this respect. That is, compared to the immediately preceding trial the plethysmograph
objectively registered a more intense facial coloration during the target trial, the interdependent
‘victims’ observed a stronger blush response, and the defecting participants themselves experienced a
stronger blush response during the target trial. Meanwhile, there was no convincing correlation
between the physiologically measured and subjectively observed intensity of the blush. The absence of
such a correlation is a common finding (e.g. Shearn et al., 1990; Mulkens et al., 1999; Drummond,
2001; Drummond & Lim, 2000) and is probably due to differential skin properties (e.g. its tone, level
of pigmentation, thickness) influencing the visual reddening of the skin during a blush response. The
fact that in the present study the blush intensity of each defector was judged by a different observer
might have further reduced the chance of finding a reliable correlation between the physiological and
subjective intensity of the defectors’ blush response.
Blushing and Global Evaluation
The global personality characteristics that were attributed to the interdependent participants became
considerably less positive after these individuals raised the ‘defect’ sign on the target trial. Yet this drop
in ‘social affection’ was not modified by the strength of the observed blush response (hypothesis 2).
Thus in contrast to the earlier vignette study (de Jong, 1999, Experiments 1 & 2), no evidence emerged
to sustain the idea that blushing is effective in warding off negative attributions after a transgression.
Apart from the fact that the previous study used imagined situations rather than real-time interactions
there are several other differences that may (also) account for this apparent inconsistency.
First, the vignette study concerned a mild (nonintentional) mishap, whereas defecting, in the present
study, was primed as being an immoral act. Thus one testable explanation for the discrepancy between
both studies might be that blushing is only effective in modifying people’s affective judgements in the
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context of mild infractions. Second, and relatedly, the mishaps described in the vignettes occurred
seemingly involuntary, whereas raising the ‘defect’ sign was obviously a voluntary act. It might well be
that under such circumstances it requires more than nonverbal communication to restore what one has
done wrong. Finally, in all previous studies showing a remedial effect of displays of embarrassment
(e.g. Semin & Manstead, 1982; de Jong, 1999) or shame (e.g. Keltner et al., 1997), the participants who
observed and evaluated the actors after a social/moral infraction were not directly involved in the
pertinent social interaction. Relatedly, the actors themselves or a third party were the ‘victims’ of
the transgression, but never the evaluating participant (as was the case in the present study). Because the
hedonic relevance of the actor’s behaviour lead an observer to make internal rather than external
attributions for this behaviour (e.g. Jones & Davis, 1965), it might well be that being the victim of a
transgression may give rise to the interpretation that the transgression reflects an habitual tendency of
the actor, rather than a coincidence of situational factors. When a transgression is predominantly
attributed to the actor’s dispositions, this may undermine the otherwise remedial properties of blushing.
One way to solve this issue is to include an independent observer in future research.
Blushing and Trustworthiness
The present study revealed a significant relationship between the observable reddening of the face and
the trustworthiness attributed to the defector (hypothesis 2). However, in contrast to the idea that
blushing is a sign of moral integrity (e.g. Frank, 1988; Castelfranchi & Poggi, 1990), the present
results indicate that blushing is related to low rather than to high levels of attributed trustworthiness.
Thus, rather than serving a remedial function, blushing was found to inflate the negative influence of
defecting on the actors’ trustworthiness. In passing note that although blushing was related to observed
shamefulness, observed shamefulness per se was not related to the defectors’ trustworthiness. Thus,
the present pattern of results suggests that the communicative properties of blushing are rather specific
and not readily exchangeable with other signs of shame (cf. Keltner, 1995; Keltner & Buswell, 1997),
perhaps because of the involuntary nature of the blush.
One explanation for the negative link between blushing and trustworthiness might follow from the
fact that in the present context a noncooperative choice was said to be immoral, because of its negative
consequences for the interdependent others (see above). Accordingly, in the present context,
displaying a blush might serve as a signal for the ‘victim’ that the defector indeed shares the same
moral values but at the same time behaves in an immoral way. It seems reasonable to argue that giving
oneself away as being someone who does not follow her or his own moral principles might undermine
one’s trustworthiness. However, in apparent conflict with this explanation we recently found that even
after a clear-cut voluntary socially unacceptable act (e.g. damaging a bicycle) blushing still sustained
the actors’ trustworthiness (De Jong, Peters, & De Cremer, ‘Whoever blushes is already guilty’:
Revealing effects of blushing in the context of ambiguous social situations, 2001).
An alternative explanation for the apparent negative (rather than the alleged positive) influence of
the blush in the present PDG might be that in the current context, ‘victims’ used the blush response to
deduce and interpret the ‘cheater’s motive. Note that in contrast to previous studies, the antecedent
behaviour involved in the present study, though being obviously voluntary, is not unambiguous with
respect to the perpetrators’ intentionality. For example, raising the ‘defect’ sign on the fourth trial
could be interpreted as innocent playing around (e.g. to prevent the experiment from getting boring),
but also as an intentional (and thus unfair) act to maximise the outcomes for the self at the expense of
the interdependent others. In such a context, displaying a blush may substantiate the observers’
suspicion that the blusher has behaved in a socially inappropriate manner. That is, the observers might
have interpreted blushing as a sign of intentionality (‘true innocence doesn’t need a blush’), and thus as
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revealing the defectors’ immoral motive. In its turn, such an interpretation is likely to have resulted in
lower levels of attributed trustworthiness (cf. Semin, 1982). In line with such an explanation, a
subsequent vignette study showed that blushing sustains the actors’ trustworthiness after a mishap or
voluntary moral transgression, but not in the context of situations that are ambiguous with respect to
the (intentionality of ) antecedent behaviours (de Jong et al., submitted, 2001). In the latter type of
situations, blushing was interpreted as signalling that the situation should be interpreted as an
intentional violation of a social standard resulting in lower levels of attributed trustworthiness.
Thus it appears that the functional properties of blushing may be context dependent. In case of
unambiguous antecedent behaviours, blushing has face-saving qualities, but in the context of more
ambiguous social situations blushing may serve a revealing rather than an appeasing function. Thus by
virtue of its involuntary nature, blushing may sometimes unwantedly signify that the blusher has done
or thought something undesirable. Because in most social situations there is some degree of ambiguity
with respect to the elicitors of an individual’s blush response, the unwanted ‘revealing’ effects of
blushing may well prevail its appeasing functions in real life. This may help to explain why people
generally consider blushing as an undesirable response (Shields et al., 1990) and some individuals
even develop a phobia of blushing (Mulkens et al., 2001).
Blushing and Conciliatory Behaviour
Given the negative influence of blushing on the trustworthiness attributed to the defectors, it might not
be very surprising that blushing did not stimulate conciliatory behaviours in the present context
(hypothesis 3). Accordingly, the blush of the participants whose interdependents continued with
cooperation on the fifth trial (i.e. after being cheated) was not significantly more intense (neither
physiologically, nor observed) than the blush of the participants whose interdependents raised the
‘defect’ sign on the fifth trial. However, it should be acknowledged that in contrast to what would be
expected on the basis of previous research (e.g. van Lange, 1999), the vast majority of the present
(prosocial) participants continued cooperation after being cheated. That is, recent research (De Cremer
& van Lange, 2001; van Lange, 1999) illustrated that particularly prosocials reciprocate defecting
behaviour. Thus, it appears that other mechanisms might have been at work here that discouraged the
victims to turn to a noncooperative strategy after being cheated, and which might have overruled the
influence of blushing per se.
Perhaps the most important factor that might have played a role here is the fact that the game was
framed as a test of moral behaviour. This was done to optimalize the chance of eliciting a blush
response in the defecting individuals; yet at the same time this procedure might have undermined the
habitual strategy of the (prosocial) ‘victims’ to reciprocate defecting behaviour. Because both
participants could clearly see each other as well as the research assistant, accountability effects might
have further attenuated prosocials’ habitual tendency to reciprocate interdependents’ cheating
behaviour (cf. De Cremer, Snyder, & Dewitte, 2001). Thus, before discarding blushing as a potential
modulator of observers’ behaviours, it would be important in future research to manipulate these
characteristics of the present experimental set-up (e.g. by varying the framing of the experiment and
varying the visibility of the interdependent participant/research assistant during the test).
Future Research
All in all, the present pattern of results provide several leads for further research. First, it seems
important in future studies to actually vary the level of ambiguity with respect to the actor’s
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intentionality in the context of real-time interactions. Such a strategy would allow us to test whether,
indeed, the communicative properties of blushing vary as a function of the perceived intentionality of
the transgressor. Second, the finding that the experimental procedure was successful in eliciting a
physiologically detectable blush indicates that the present PDG might be useful to further investigate
the dynamics of blushing as a function of individuals’ social value orientation. According to
Castelfranchi and Poggi’s (1990) model, the blush response communicates to the observers that the
actor shares their values despite the current violation. For being a reliable signal, this communicative
account of blushing implies that the blush response should only emerge if the actor, indeed, shares the
values of the observers. Thus in the context of the present experimental set-up, blushing should only
emerge if the defectors as well as the interdependent participants are prosocial individuals (or when a
prosocial defector assumes that the interdependent is prosocial).
Therefore, it would be worth while to examine whether the present results are robust by including
also pro-self orientated individuals who aim at either enhancing outcomes for self with no or little
regard to others’ outcomes (i.e. individualists), or enhancing relative advantage over others’ outcomes
(i.e. competitors; Messick & McClintock, 1968). Among such individuals blushing should not be as
easily elicited as in prosocials, because proselfs tend to consider defecting as a sensible and intelligent
strategy rather than as a moral transgression (e.g. van Lange, 1999).
Relatedly, one might expect that blushing has a different meaning in proselfs than in prosocials.
That is, proselfs may infer from others’ blushing that these individuals are exploitable rather than
lacking trustworthiness, as was reported by the present group of prosocial participants (cf. Liebrand
et al., 1986; the might versus morality effect). Thus, including both participants with a proself and
participants with a prosocial value orientation may reveal more insights in the psychological meaning
of blushing in interdependent contacts, and at the same time, such a strategy may also provide
physiological support for the frequently observed differences in motivations between prosocials and
proselfs (see De Cremer & van Lange, 2001).
To conclude, then, the present approach opens a new avenue for investigating the context dependent
dynamics as well as the context dependent communicative properties of blushing as a function of
personality characteristics (such as social value orientation) of both the actors and the observers.
Therefore, the present PDG might well be a fruitful approach for both emotion theorists who are
interested in the functional properties of social emotions, and social psychologists who are interested
in people’s behaviour in interdependent situations as a function of their social value orientation.
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